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 Th e events of 9/11 have infl uenced policy making in 
public administration. Th e Homeland Security Act of 
2002, which created the  Department of Homeland Se-
curity, contained language that empowered the secretary 
of homeland security and the director of the Offi  ce of 
Personnel Management to establish a personnel manage-
ment system outside the normal provisions of the federal 
civil service. Why did civil service reform succeed as part 
of this legislation when previous attempts at large-scale 
reform had failed? A case analysis of the enactment of 
civil service reform in the Homeland Security Act points 
to theories of policy emergence and certain models of 
presidential and congressional policy making. In this 
case, civil service reform became associated with national 
security instead of management reform. An assessment of 
the rhetorical arguments used to frame this policy image 
off ers a powerful explanation for the adoption of the 
personnel management reforms in the Homeland Security 
Act. Th is case has implications for understanding how 
policy makers might approach future management reform 
agendas. 
 The events of September 11, 2001, changed the context, priorities, and goals of public sector management reform. Moynihan and Roberts, 
for example, ask how 9/11 “reshaped perceptions 
about the role of government and the goals of public 
sector reform” (2002, 130 – 31). One series of events 
that illustrates the impact of 9/11 on public sector 
management reform is the enactment of the personnel 
management provisions of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (HSA). 
 Th e HSA created the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS) by combining 22 existing agencies and 
170,000 federal employees into a new cabinet-level 
department — the largest and most complex reorganiza-
tion of the federal government since the Department 
of Defense was created nearly six decades earlier. Th e 
legislation gave the DHS authority to initiate new 
approaches to personnel management outside the 
normal rules of the federal civil service. Th is new 
personnel management  authority was potentially the 
broadest and most  signifi cant change in civil service 
law since the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 
 Th e personnel management provision of the HSA 
was perhaps the most contentious aspect of the 
 proposed law, tying up fi nal passage of the legislation 
until after the 2002 midterm elections and pitting the 
administration and major federal employee unions 
against one another in a hard-fought battle for sup-
port on Capitol Hill. Why did civil service reform 
succeed as part of the Homeland Security Act when 
other attempts at broad reform had failed? How did 
the events of 9/11 aff ect this outcome? Th ese ques-
tions are examined through an analytical case study of 
the enactment of the personnel management reforms 
in the HSA. Th is analysis helps to explain how and 
why a signifi cant administrative policy change took 
place, and the research suggests implications for un-
derstanding policy making for future management 
reform agendas. 
 Examining the Policy Environment and 
Legislative Decision Making 
 In examining the case of personnel management 
policy making in the HSA, both the policy environ-
ment and the emergence of policy proposals provide 
important frames to understand how the legislation 
came to pass. Additionally, the role of communication 
and rhetoric likely played a key role in how the 
arguments were received. 
 Policy Environments and the Emergence of 
Policy Proposals 
 Policy environments can be viewed as stable, charac-
terized by policy subsystems and open only to incre-
mental change.  Baumgartner and Jones (1993) , 
however, present a model of policy change in which 
the apparent long-term policy equilibrium is not 
changed incrementally but is punctuated by brief 
periods of large-scale change. Change occurs when the 
existing policy equilibrium is disrupted because new 
policy makers and institutions enter the debate, policy 
subsystems cede exclusive claims to the issue, policy 
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images and venues change, and the policy debate 
moves from a micropolitical into a macropolitical 
environment in which it is associated with larger 
issues or considered by a wider set of policy makers. 
In the macropolitical environment, rhetoric can be 
particularly infl uential in upsetting the status quo. 
Rhetoric, for the purposes of this essay, may be 
 defi ned as “the use of words by human agents to form 
attitudes or induce actions in other human agents” 
( Burke 1950, 41 ). 
 Kingdon asserts that policy agendas emerge and move 
ahead when “policy windows” open: “Policy windows, 
the opportunities for action on given initiatives, pres-
ent themselves and stay open for only short periods” 
(1995, 166). Policy windows can open when there is a 
change in administration, a turnover of political 
 actors, or a shift in national mood, or when a problem 
becomes pressing (168 – 69). Moynihan sees the 
 enactment of the Homeland Security Act as one of 
those limited and temporary instances in which dra-
matic policy change was accomplished. In this case, 
Moynihan notes, “the White House had to overcome 
a highly stable policy subsystem, characterized by the 
power of the public service unions. . . . [M]oving the 
issue to the macropolitical arena, and changing the 
issue image and policy venue are methods to create 
disequilibrium in the public management subsystem” 
(2005, 192). 
 A case analysis of the passage of the Homeland Secu-
rity Act conforms to these general theories of policy 
emergence and policy change. Moreover, an examina-
tion of the communication surrounding the issue 
helps to explain how, when the issue moved to the 
macropolitical environment, changes in rhetorical 
strategies serve as a powerful explanation for the out-
come. Reviews of documentary evidence and inter-
views with key individuals involved in the issue 
provide the data on which this case analysis is based. 
 Background 
 Th e history of the U.S. federal civil service can be 
viewed as comprising four rather distinct periods that 
suggest a long-term pattern of punctuated policy 
equilibrium. Th e fi rst century of the new republic can 
be seen as the era of the “spoils system.” Th e second 
period covers the time of the Pendleton Civil Service 
Act, 1883 – 1978. Th e third period is that of the 
Civil Service Reform Act, from 1978 to the current 
era. Finally, the fourth period, which was mostly 
incremental reform, began sometime in the 1990s, 
around the twentieth anniversary of the Civil Service 
Reform Act. 
 Th e idea of large-scale change in civil service law did 
not spring de novo into the policy debates in 2002. 
Successive administrations from Ronald Reagan to 
George W. Bush had made broad legislative proposals 
to change federal personnel management but had to 
settle for more incremental, smaller-scale change as 
Congress declined to act on broad personnel 
management reform legislation. 
 Th e George W. Bush administration had a personnel 
management policy agenda as a part of the President’s 
Management Agenda, a comprehensive program to 
identify management reforms and improve govern-
ment performance in fi ve key areas. One of the prior-
ity areas was the strategic management of human 
capital. According to Richard  Falkenrath (2005) , 
special assistant to the president and senior director 
for policy and plans in the Offi  ce of Homeland 
Security, 
 Th e President had a management agenda 
pre-9/11 and it wasn’t getting any traction. Th e 
President’s Management Agenda . . . basically 
wanted to improve the quality of management 
in the federal executive branch. Th e hallmarks 
of [the President’s Management Agenda] were: 
less congressional micromanagement, greater or 
broader statutory mandates, larger appropria-
tions accounts, and executive discretion to hire 
and fi re and control the departments. Th e phil-
osophical essence of the President’s Manage-
ment Agenda was basically to treat department 
and agency heads like CEOs, and let them 
control their agencies. 
 Th e administration had developed its policy agenda 
but was having trouble advancing it. Th ere was a 
policy-in-waiting. A window of opportunity had not 
yet appeared. 
 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
 Th e events of 9/11 opened a policy window. Th e birth 
of the DHS can be viewed as a rare opportunity for 
President Bush to leverage the momentum behind 
homeland security to implement personnel reform, 
perhaps even extending it throughout the entire 
federal government ( Ryan 2003, 103 ). 
 Soon after 9/11, the White House established the 
Offi  ce of Homeland Security in the Executive Offi  ce 
of the President. Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge 
was appointed the president’s senior advisor for home-
land security. But even before 9/11, some in Congress 
had been pushing for the creation of a cabinet-level 
Department of Homeland Defense — chief among 
them Senator Joseph Lieberman, chairman of the 
Senate Government Aff airs Committee. Th e adminis-
tration had initially rejected the idea of a new cabinet 
department, but faced with increasing pressure from 
Capitol Hill, the administration set about to draft a 
proposal for a homeland security department. A small 
group of fi ve White House staff  members, overseen by 
a senior-level group, was charged with designing the 
Civil Service Reform as National Security  401 
new department. Th ey worked in secret in the 
 President’s Emergency Operations Center. 
 Drafting the Legislation 
 On June 6, 2002, the White House announced its 
proposal for a new Department of Homeland 
 Security. Management fl exibility was addressed only 
in general terms at the time of the announcement. 
Briefi ng the press as a “senior administration offi  cial,” 
Homeland Security Advisor Ridge said, “It is our 
hope . . . that as we send specifi c legislation to the 
Hill that this new cabinet secretary . . . will be given 
the freedom to manage; i.e., we’d like to see some 
fl exibility . . . so that they can move people and 
 resources around in times of crisis or emergency. 
I think that’s critical” (White House 2006). 
 Th e merger of 22 agencies posed large integration 
challenges in personnel management. Th e entities to 
be merged into the DHS consisted of 17 diff erent 
unions, 77 existing collective bargaining agreements, 
22 human resources servicing offi  ces, and eight pay-
roll systems. For some, the mere act of merging dispa-
rate entities with detailed agency-specifi c personnel 
management policies into a new department necessi-
tated a new system of personnel management. Others 
argued that it was the urgent nature of the DHS 
mission that called for new approaches to personnel 
management. Representative Rob  Portman (2002) , 
then a member of the House Select Committee on 
Homeland Security and now director of the Offi  ce of 
Management and Budget, said, “It’s absolutely critical, 
if this department is going to work, that the President 
be able to take the 22 diff erent personnel systems . . . 
and meld them together in a way that we . . . make an 
eff ective agency to combat terrorism. Th e agility of 
the terrorist needs to be matched by a more agile 
federal workforce.” One member of the White House 
staff  group said, 
 It wasn’t a big debate. Th is represents an oppor-
tunity to change the way federal civil service is 
wrought. And we need to do that; it’s in desper-
ate need of reform. Th ere was nobody there that 
didn’t think it was in desperate need of reform. 
So, to that extent, the decision to do it was very 
easy and not contentious. I don’t want to say 
the decision was made lightly, but I don’t think 
it was ever a debate. ( Lawlor 2005 ) 
 Th e Republican leadership on Capitol Hill asked for 
draft legislation quickly, and the White House staff  
group worked with the Offi  ce of Personnel Manage-
ment (OPM) and others to draft the legislation. 
 According to Brad  Berenson (2005) , who chaired 
the drafting team, 
 [I] put together a legislative drafting team. Th is 
group sub-delegated some of the drafting work 
to the OMB [Offi  ce of Management and 
 Budget] for contracting issues and OPM for the 
personnel provisions. I was put in charge of the 
process for writing the legislation. Th is would 
be the fi rst time the president had sent actual 
bill language to Congress because all previous 
proposals had been outlines or concepts. . . . We 
worked around the clock. So, we didn’t have a 
lot of time to tinker with what we received from 
OMB and OPM. We might have kicked the 
tires a little, but we basically just dropped their 
work into the bill. 
 Th e legislation contained language that gave the DHS 
secretary and OPM director authority to institute new 
personnel management rules “notwithstanding” the 
provisions of Title 5. Section (a), the heart of the 
personnel management provision of the proposed bill, 
contained just 68 words: 
 Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
title [Title 5], the Secretary of Homeland 
 Security may, in regulations prescribed jointly 
with the Director of the Offi  ce of Personnel 
Management, establish, and from time to time 
adjust, a human resources management system 
for some or all of the organizational units of the 
Department of Homeland Security, which shall 
be fl exible, contemporary, and grounded in the 
public employment principles of merit and 
fi tness. 
 Section (b) required simply that any new system be 
“fl exible and “contemporary,” preserve the principles 
of merit and fi tness, maintain equal employment and 
other employee rights and remedies, and ensure the 
right to organize and bargain collectively and made 
certain pay provisions nonwaivable. Th is section also 
contained a fi ve-year sunset provision on the authority 
to issue new regulations. 
 Th is provision of the HSA introduced the most dra-
matic potential shift in the direction of federal person-
nel management since the Civil Service Reform Act. 
Writing in general language to empower the DHS 
secretary and OPM director to establish new person-
nel management practices avoided time-consuming 
debate over the details of any such plan. OPM direc-
tor Kay  Cole James (2005 ) explained, “Our initial 
take at this was, ‘Let’s make the legislation as broad as 
possible so that we could have the freedom to fi ll in 
the details as we went along.’” Th e administration’s 
bill, H.R. 5005, was introduced in the House on June 
24, 2002, with expectations that it would pass 
quickly. 
 Opposition Emerges 
 Th e fi rst signs that the bill’s personnel management 
language might cause political problems emerged 
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quickly. Th ose key words — “notwithstanding any 
other provision” — immediately triggered a problem. 
As Richard  Falkenrath (2005) , a member of the staff  
group said, 
 We had no idea what we were “notwithstand-
ing.” Title 5 is a big title. It turns out Title 5 
contains whistleblower protections. So, within 
two days the unions are putting out a press 
release that says the president wants to end 
whistleblower protections. Well, that’s nonsense. 
We don’t want to end whistleblower protections. 
We wanted to give the secretary the authority to 
write new regulations for the personnel system, 
notwithstanding what had come before. 
 Union opposition was quick in coming. Th e American 
Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) and 
the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) 
asserted that the personnel management proposal 
threatened collective bargaining agreements and elimi-
nated protections for federal workers. Still smarting 
from President Bush’s earlier revocation of Clinton-era 
labor partnerships, union leaders saw the HSA per-
sonnel provisions as just one more piece of evidence 
that the Bush administration was out to break the 
unions. In labor’s view, the administration wanted to 
“eliminate collective bargaining rights . . . and exercise 
unchecked power over federal workers” ( AFL-CIO 
2002 ). Th e fi ght over the DHS bill became, in large 
part, a fi ght over personnel management rules. 
Th e struggle over the personnel reform portion 
of the HSA led to delayed action in the Senate 
up to the midterm elections of 2002. 
 Congressional Consideration 
 Congressional action began in the House and Senate 
almost simultaneously, but on diff erent legislative 
proposals. In the Senate, the Government Aff airs 
Committee voted favorably on the Lieberman bill out 
of committee on June 24, 2002 — the same day the 
administration’s bill, H.R. 5005, was introduced in 
the House. In the House, Speaker Dennis Hastert 
parceled out portions of the bill to all of the commit-
tees of jurisdiction but appointed a nine-member 
Select Committee on Homeland Security, chaired by 
majority leader Dick Armey, to coordinate the House 
legislative process on this legislation. 
 Th e Senate committee moved fi rst on the Lieberman 
bill, but the House was quicker to move on the 
 administration’s bill. Hearings and markup sessions 
went on immediately in all of the committees, and all 
discharged their bills on July 12, 2002. Once the 
House committees reported their markups, the select 
committee acted quickly to bring a bill to the fl oor. 
Th e bill provided the DHS secretary with greater 
management fl exibility in the areas of performance 
appraisal, job classifi cation, pay rates and systems, 
labor management systems, and adverse actions and 
appeals. It also provided civil rights and disabled 
protections, preserved veterans’ preferences in hiring, 
and ensured that the Fair Labor Standards Act, Social 
Security Act, and Family and Medical Leave Act 
would continue to apply to federal employment. 
Finally, the bill also preserved workers’ right to orga-
nize, but it continued the president’s authority to 
limit collective bargaining for national security reasons 
and extended this authority to the secretary of 
homeland security (U.S.  House 2002 , 2 – 3). 
 Th e House took up the bill on July 26. Six amend-
ments were defeated on close party-line votes. Th e 
House passed the bill on a vote of 295 – 132. 
 Th e bill then moved to the Senate, where two cloture 
motions were made to try to bring a bill to the fl oor. 
Both were withdrawn, and Senate majority leader 
Tom Daschle announced that a vote on the bill would 
be put off  until after the August recess. Th e real fi ght 
over the bill would take place in the Senate. When the 
Senate returned to Washington after the summer 
recess, the bill was brought to the fl oor for considera-
tion on 12 days between September 4 and September 
25 before it was returned to committee. As the debate 
raged on and off  the Senate fl oor, it became more 
political and more partisan. 
 Tom Ridge and Kay Cole James asserted that they 
were open to working with the unions.  Ridge (2006) 
explained, “We spent a lot of time assuring them 
[legislators] that we would engage with the unions, 
and we did seriously consider many of their objections 
and  recommendations.” Ridge and James also claimed 
that they were willing to make deals and concessions 
to get the bill passed. According to  James (2005 ), “We 
were willing to put a lot on the table. At fi rst I don’t 
know if they really believed we had the authority to 
do that and could deliver. But we did.” Colleen  Kelly 
(2005) , NTEU president, described these interactions 
somewhat diff erently: “Any time I requested a meet-
ing, we got a meeting. . . . [T]he issue was just that 
very often the conversation . . . would seem to me was 
going very well . . . and then we would leave the 
room, and they would go right back to where they 
started from.” Th e NTEU’s Maureen  Gilman (2005) 
said, “We were working . . . to get a compromise. We 
were willing to give up virtually anything, . . . but as 
they got closer to the election they wanted this 
 ppolitical issue. Th ey did not want a compromise.” 
 No compromise was reached, and the issue remained 
undecided as Congress headed into the November 
elections. 
 The November Elections 
 Th ere were clear diff erences between the administra-
tion and the unions on issues that were important to 
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both. Each side also had a diff erent perception of 
what the fi ght was all about. For the administration, 
the issue was management fl exibility to fi x a broken 
personnel management system. For the unions, the 
issue was collective bargaining agreements and the 
rights of organized workers. A central issue in the 
fi ght became the existing law that gave the president 
authority to abrogate union agreements on national 
security grounds. Th e unions wanted to limit this 
authority in the HSA, whereas the administration 
sought to preserve and perhaps even extend it. Eff orts 
to amend the president’s authority failed, but they 
fueled the debate that was being framed as national 
security versus labor rights. 
 Th e campaigns of two Senate Democrats, Jean 
 Carnahan (Missouri) and Max Cleland (Georgia), 
were aff ected by this debate ( Moynihan 2005 ). 
 Campaign ads portrayed Senator Cleland, a triple-
amputee Vietnam War veteran, as anti – national 
security and pro – special interest ( Lowry 2004 ). 
 President Bush visited Missouri several times in 
 October and November to lend support to Represen-
tative Jim Talent’s senatorial bid against incumbent 
Jean Carnahan, arguing at one campaign stop that 
“Jim Talent understands what I’m talking about. You 
put him in the Senate; we’ll get us a good homeland 
security bill, which will make it easier for presidents 
to protect America” ( Bush 2002 ). Colleen  Kelly 
(2005) , president of the NTEU,  refl ected, “Th ey 
framed those who were in the Democratic Party [as] 
supporting us, and even the one or two Republicans 
or Independents who were on our side — to keep this 
thing alive — they framed them as unpatriotic.” 
 Washington Post columnist Stephen  Barr (2005) 
 observed, “Th e defeat of Max Cleland, a  Vietnam 
war veteran who said that labor rights and employee 
rights should not be changed and who then goes 
down in defeat in his home state, left Democrats 
very embittered on this front.” 
 When the results of the midterm elections were in, 
the administration had gained a Republican majority 
in the Senate and enough support to pass H.R. 5005 
with the personnel management fl exibilities provision 
intact. Th e election results were broadly interpreted as 
a national judgment on Bush’s stand on homeland 
security ( Conley 2002 ). Passage of the HSA did not 
even have to wait for a new Congress to be seated in 
January. Instead, Congress returned for a rare post-
election “lame duck” session to take up the HSA. 
OPM legislative director John  Gartland (2005) 
 explained, “It [the elections] sent a message back here. 
A bunch of other Democrats and Republicans, they 
quickly got along, and they passed that bill. ‘Get it 
out of here! Look at what happened to Cleland and 
others.’” Colleen  Kelly (2005) , president of the 
NTEU, also credited the election results for passage 
of the bill: 
 Well, in the end it went through because of the 
midterm elections. I like to think we’d still be 
fi ghting about it even if it was a very narrow 
margin keeping the debate alive. So, the only 
reason it ended was because of the results of the 
midterm election. And seeing people like Max 
Cleland being portrayed as unpatriotic because 
he supported the rights of the employees who 
provide the protection on the front lines every-
day. I’ll never forget those midterm elections. I 
knew that night what was going to happen. 
And it did. You know, within two weeks they 
acted on the legislation. 
 Final Passage 
 After the elections, the House language was inserted 
into the Senate bill, and last-minute compromises 
were reached on some key issues. A fi nal deal with key 
senators provided that the DHS would collaborate 
with unions before any rule changes and that the 
president would notify Congress and wait 10 days 
before waiving union agreements for national security 
reasons. Such waivers would be limited to a four-year 
period. 
 Th e fi nal language on personnel management 
amounted to considerably more than the original 
proposal, though the broad grant of authority to make 
new personnel management rules was preserved. Title 
VII, subtitle G, section 761 added a new chapter 97 
to Title 5 for the management of personnel in the 
DHS. It included the broader language of the House 
bill as amended in the Senate. In addition, a signifi -
cant amendment, championed by Senator George 
Voinovich and incorporated as Title XIII of the HSA, 
established new chief human capital offi  cers through-
out the agencies of the federal government. It also 
set new requirements for the OPM to establish sys-
tems, standards, and metrics for assessing the manage-
ment of human capital. Th ough managerial in its 
focus, the chief human capital offi  cer provision can 
be viewed as an additional civil service reform, appli-
cable government-wide, accomplished through the 
vehicle of the HSA. 
 On the Senate fl oor, the fi nal HSA language was 
proposed by Senator Fred Th ompson. In a last-ditch 
eff ort to block the bill, Senator Lieberman proposed 
an amendment to create instead a National Commis-
sion on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. A 
cloture vote was passed 65 – 29 to limit debate and 
permit the vote. Th e HSA passed the Senate 90 – 9 on 
November 19. Th e House subsequently passed it on 
November 22. President Bush signed Public Law 
107-269 on November 25, 2002. 
 Policy Change and Rhetorical Framing 
 Prior to the enactment of the HSA, recent administra-
tions had to settle for incremental change in federal 
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personnel management. Why did broad policy change 
succeed in 2002 when other recent attempts at large-
scale reform had failed? 
 Th is case study demonstrates that personnel manage-
ment reform associated with homeland security con-
forms to the theories of policy emergence and policy 
change off ered by  Kingdon (1995) and  Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993) , as well as the force of rhetoric 
 described by  Burke (1950) . Th e personnel provisions 
of H.R. 5005 provide an example of punctuated 
equilibrium: an extended period of stability and 
incremental change that gave way to a brief period of 
large-scale change. Reform overcame a strong policy 
subsystem through a change in the policy venue and a 
change in the policy image. Th e policy image changed 
when personnel management reform became associated 
with national security. Th e policy venue changed fi rst 
when the legislation came under the control of a select 
committee in the House rather than the usual com-
mittees of jurisdiction and, ultimately, when the issue 
moved into a macropolitical environment in which 
the normal policy subsystem could not dominate. 
 But the most powerful explanation for the outcome 
rests with the argument that the personnel manage-
ment policy was created and made relevant by the 
events of 9/11 and the rhetoric of national security. 
Of all the arguments made in favor of this and past 
reform attempts, “national security” is the only argu-
ment that was unique to the reform proposal follow-
ing 9/11. Reform proponents built on the national 
security argument in many ways; for example, the 
administration argued repeatedly that the need for 
management fl exibility was directly related to the 
ability to protect the American people in times of 
crisis or terrorist threats. Past reform arguments were 
similarly resurrected as being connected with the 
national security eff ort, and consequently, the rhetori-
cal theme of 9/11 was brought into the debate, chang-
ing the stakes of the potential outcome of the 
legislation. Th e unions and reform opponents were 
forced into a defensive position on issues of national 
security, having to argue that the current system was 
suffi  cient to deal with personnel matters in the event 
of another national security crisis. Beyond this defen-
sive position, they continued to argue on behalf of 
collective bargaining rights, an argument that had 
been successful in the past. However, what this case 
demonstrates is the immense impact of 9/11, even on 
issues that had never before been associated with 
national security. Ultimately, the administration was 
able to leverage the rhetorical force of that tragic event 
to accomplish what previous administrations had 
failed to do. 
 Implications and Lessons Learned 
 Since at least the 20th anniversary of the Civil Service 
Reform Act, many who deal in civil service policy 
believed that a new round of reform was needed, but 
achieving reform had proven diffi  cult. Even many 
limited attempts at legislation by recent administra-
tions had failed. Th is time, it was diff erent. Th is case 
study suggests some implications for the continuation 
of current personnel management reform eff orts and 
some lessons for future administrative reform agendas. 
 Salient Argumentation 
 One powerful lesson is the importance of framing the 
debate about administrative reform in salient terms 
for an audience beyond the usual policy subsystem. 
Simply stated, the supporters of reform presented 
their arguments in terms of national security, and 
their opponents argued in terms of collective bargain-
ing rights. A debate framed as “national security versus 
union special interests” is quite diff erent from one that 
might have been framed as “management fl exibility 
versus workers rights,” for instance, or a debate mired 
in the details of civil service law. In the post-911 
policy environment, national security was a political 
trump card, certainly. However, perhaps more impor-
tant to the passage of this legislation was the associa-
tion of administrative reform with a higher-level 
policy issue. Th is rhetorical move may have been 
responsible for gaining public, political, and congres-
sional support for reform because the argument capi-
talized on broader policy preferences for enhancing 
national security. 
 Timing and Opportunity 
 Administrative reform emerges and is successfully 
enacted when the timing is right and opportunity is 
recognized. Otherwise, the imperative for change can 
be lost to other more pressing priorities. As Bruce 
 Lawlor (2005) expressed it, “I don’t think you’d see 
any kind of civil service reform if it wasn’t in the con-
text of this bill. Washington just doesn’t move except 
in times of crisis. . . . Th is gave them the momentum 
that they needed to try to reform the system.” It is 
hard to imagine something like personnel manage-
ment reform otherwise igniting the political passions 
seen in this case. 
 Use the Experts — Or Not? 
 Th e HSA proposal was drafted in secret by a small 
group of staff  in the White House. It was not coordi-
nated with the aff ected departments or agencies. Th is 
process proved successful in getting a policy proposal 
done in a timely manner, without having to deal with 
resistance. But it also meant that the complex details 
of personnel policy went unaddressed. Th e staff  group 
lacked expertise in civil service laws and rules, so when 
it came time for the proposal to be put into legislative 
language, experts from the OPM had to be consulted, 
but with little time for detailed work. Th e bill was 
written in very general terms. Th e less detail there was 
in the bill, proponents believed, the less there would 
be to debate, argue, and amend. On the other hand, 
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the paucity of detail paved the way for critiques by the 
opposition. Some of these critiques proved legally 
valid, and the unions won some key concessions in 
federal court ( Barr 2006a ). 
 Seeking Compromise and Consensus 
 Th is case shows that attempts at compromise and 
consultation, whether genuine or not, failed to pro-
duce consensus. Additionally, the successful legal 
challenges mounted by the public sector unions have 
interfered with the successful implementation of 
personnel management reform at both the DHS and 
the  Department of Defense. Issues that were not 
resolved in the policy-making process had to be 
fought after enactment in the context of legal chal-
lenges and regulation writing. Th e price of secrecy, 
generality, and dissensus in the design and enactment 
phases may well have been delay and discord during 
the implementation phase. When questions of politics 
and policy are not addressed prior to enactment, they 
must be addressed afterward. 
 Conclusion 
 Civil service reform in the context of the HSA pro-
vides a useful example of public administration policy 
making in a macropolitical context. It has important 
implications for understanding how policy making 
can transcend the narrow public administration policy 
domain and suggests that strategies for future manage-
ment reforms might well include considerations for 
rhetorical framing and the relationship of reform to 
broader issues of public concern. 
 Epilogue 
 Th e passage of the HSA in December of 2002 did not 
end the fi ght over a new personnel management sys-
tem for the DHS. Instead, the fi ght shifted to legal 
challenges over the regulations for implementing the 
new personnel rules. 
 Less than a year after the HSA was enacted, the 
OPM’s design team completed its work and pre-
sented a report with 52 design options to top OPM 
and DHS offi  cials. Th e design team had held 10 
open town hall meetings and focus groups with 
employees and union representatives. OPM director 
Kay Cole James stated, “Th is process is a model for 
how management and labor can work together with 
mutual respect even though there may be real policy 
diff erences” (OPM 2003). Th e General Accounting 
Offi  ce (GAO, now the Government Accountability 
Offi  ce) analyzed the process used to design the new 
system and found that the OPM’s eff ort “generally 
refl ects important elements of eff ective transforma-
tions” (GAO 2003). Th e GAO also recommended 
that the DHS “ensure that the communication 
strategy used to support the human capital system 
maximizes opportunities for employee 
involvement.” 
 Writing the proposed regulations took nearly 15 
months. On January 26, 2005, DHS secretary Tom 
Ridge announced the new regulations. According to 
Ridge, the new regulations were better designed to 
“both attract and maintain a quality workforce” com-
pared to the old General Schedule system, as well as 
to provide the necessary management fl exibility 
needed for national security. As Ridge put it, there are 
“many occasions where we have to move people 
around quickly, [and] we don’t have the latitude to sit 
down and discuss it or bargain” ( Zeller 2005 ). Union 
leaders responded immediately, charging that the new 
personnel system violated the intent of the HSA with 
regard to collective bargaining rights. In addition, 
AFGE president John Gage asserted that the new rules 
would “encourage management [by] coercion and 
intimidation” and called it “a scam to reduce overall 
federal pay” ( Zeller 2005 ). 
 Th e following day, January 27, 2005, the unions fi led 
suit to prevent the implementation of the fi rst phase 
of the new personnel system, asking the federal dis-
trict court to issue an injunction against the fi nal rules 
( Pear 2005a ). On August 12, 2005, three days before 
the new rules were to take eff ect, Judge Rosemary M. 
Collyer issued two rulings: fi rst, that the new person-
nel rules did not ensure collective bargaining as 
 required by the law that created the department, and 
second, that they did not provide fair treatment or 
due process for employees who appeal disciplinary 
actions (Pear 2005b). On September 7, 2005, the 
DHS announced that it would delay the implementa-
tion of new personnel rules by as much as a year 
( Washington Post 2005a), and in mid-November of 
2005, the DHS fi led an appeal to overturn the August 
12, 2005, rulings. 
 On June 27, 2006, a federal appeals court upheld 
both rulings by Judge Collyer. NTEU president 
 Colleen Kelly called the appeals court ruling “a sweep-
ing legal victory,” and she also noted that she hoped 
she could work with Michael Chertoff  to “work out a 
system that can be supported and will allow employ-
ees to do their jobs” (Barr 2006b). But Kelly also 
suggested that she was not certain a deal could be 
reached between the unions and the administration. 
In September, the Offi  ce of the Solicitor General let 
the deadline for appealing the appellate court’s deci-
sion pass. Judge Collyer has now given the DHS until 
July 17, 2007 to decide “whether it will revise person-
nel rules . . . start writing those rules from scratch, or 
abandon the defeated measure” ( Losey 2006 ). 
 While the new personnel rules were losing ground in 
the courts, the DHS was also losing congressional 
fi nancial support for the implementation of the new 
system. For fi scal year 2005, the administration had 
requested $133.5 million for DHS human resources. 
Th is amount was cut to $70 million by the House and 
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Senate appropriations committees and further cut to 
$43.2 million in conference committee ( Dizard 
2004 ). For fi scal year 2007, the administration’s 
 request of $71.5 million was cut by Congress to $25 
million, less than the $29.7 million that Congress 
gave the system in fi scal year 2006 ( Rutzick 2006 ). 
 Not only has the new DHS personnel system been 
stalled by action in the courts, but also the eff orts by 
the administration to expand personnel management 
reform have been slowed. A legal challenge to the 
National Security Personnel System in the Depart-
ment of Defense successfully thwarted the labor 
 relations portions of that department’s reforms. Con-
sequently, the department has moved ahead with 
rules, including pay banding and pay for performance, 
only for employees who are not covered by collective 
bargaining agreements. Lastly, the Working for 
 America Act, the administration’s proposal for expand-
ing personnel management reform throughout the 
federal government, has received little, if any, 
immediate support on Capitol Hill. 
 Enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was 
a signifi cant legislative accomplishment in the early 
days of the Bush administration. But the implementa-
tion of those reforms has proven diffi  cult, as the issues 
that were unresolved in the legislative phase reemerged 
as battles in the courts and in Congress. 
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Have you noticed?
PAR is Packed
…  ,  ,  ,  ,
    .
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